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Articles
Relocated Doctrine: The Travel of the
English Doctrine of Corroboration in Sex
Offense Cases to Mandate Palestine
Dr. Orna Alyagon Darr*
INTRODUCTION
The explicit narrative of the British rulers of Mandate Palestine' is one
of the implementation of modern criminal law and the defense of women,
children, and morality.2 Instituting orderly and rational administration and
law was part of the British imperial "civilizing mission."3 An examination
of the mode of proof, however, as it involved the application of the
corroboration rule in sex offense cases, reveals a different story. The
* Cannel Academic Center Law School, Israel.
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Foljanty, Adam Hofri-Winogradow, Amalia Kessler, Assaf Likhovski, Christopher Tomlins and
Steven Wilf. My thanks to Elisabeth Ford for her insightful remarks.
1. Palestine was one of the territorial units created by post-WWI peace agreements that carved up
the Middle East between France and Britain. Although the new regional units were not defined as
"colonies" but, rather, as "mandates" supervised by the League of Nations, the European imperial
powers made no essential distinction between the two types of administrative arrangements. LAURA
ROBSON, COLONIALISM AND CHRISTIANITY IN MANDATE PALESTINE 6 (2011).
2. The ordinance modifying Ottoman sexual offenses was unambiguously titled "offences against
women and children and against decency." Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, No. 2 (1927)
[hereinafter CLAO].
3. Partha Chatterjee, Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonialized Women: The Contest in India,
16 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 622, 622 (1989).
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common-law rule of corroboration prevents the adjudicator from
convicting the accused on the basis of a single individual's testimony,
credible as the witness may be, unless an additional and independent piece
of incriminating evidence is available.' Some jurisdictions (Scotland, for
example) require corroboration of all testimony in all criminal cases. Yet
the corroboration rule in common-law jurisdictions is typically limited to
cases involving the testimony of an accomplice and to cases of sexual
offenses. In the first instance, the accomplice's interest in lying to shift
most of the blame onto his or her partner to the crime is the rationale
behind the requirement to corroborate his or her testimony.' When it
comes to sexual offenses, the standard explanation for the requirement is
that such crimes are often committed in private and, therefore, that special
care -against false accusations is warranted. This rationale has been
critically attacked, for reasons that I elaborate in the following discussion.
My focus in this article is the social and cultural uses of the rule of
corroboration-a rhetorical device that allows the judiciary to identify
itself with desired legal traditions and a tool for constructing social and
cultural credibility, or lack thereof, in certain types of witnesses. Inherent
in the rule of corroboration is suspicion toward certain categories of
witnesses as untrustworthy. Even when fact finders regard specific
witnesses as truthful, honest, and credible, their testimony alone is
insufficient for conviction, since they are members of "suspicious" groups.
Analysis of the rule of corroboration in cases of sexual crimes provides an
excellent opportunity to examine the social embeddedness of evidence
law. The original goal of corroboration was to sift out false testimony.
However, treating the members of a certain social category as potentially
flawed witnesses constructed all group members as inherently flawed, and
their testimony was never sufficient for conviction. Controversy about
corroboration is a controversy about which categories of witnesses should
be believed and under what conditions. As I argue, this is an issue of
sociocultural construction and must therefore be studied within specific
historical, social, and cultural contexts.
In Part 2 of this Article, I establish the backdrop of sex offense cases in
Mandate Palestine (1918-1948) through a comparative legal history of
Ottoman and British Mandate judicial systems and substantive criminal
norms. In doing so, I introduce the inherent imperial tension between
accommodation of local sensibilities and circumstances and distrust of
local subjects. Part 3 explores the history of the English rule of
corroboration in sexual offenses. The rationale for the rule, most famously
articulated by the early modern jurist Sir Matthew Hale, was the probative
4. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 18 (1997).
5. For the rationale and history of accomplice corroboration, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE
ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 203 (2003).
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difficulty presented by such private matters and the fear of fabricated
charges. These concerns, which led to the development of a practice of
cautionary warning to the jury in cases of sex crimes, implicitly but clearly
convey the suspicious attitude of British courts toward complainants'
moral reputation and truthfulness. The concept of corroboration spread
with the advance of British rule throughout the empire.6 In Part 3, I show
how, from its inception, the corroboration requirement reflected biases
about the reliability of complainants in sexual assault cases, biases that
persisted, evolved, and expanded when English common law was later
exported abroad. Part 4 describes the practice of corroboration as applied
by the British in Mandate Palestine. Initially, the British rulers of Palestine
mandated corroboration of all testimony in all criminal cases. However,
even after this general requirement was abolished in 1936, the local
judiciary continued to demand corroboration of the testimony of
complainants in cases of sexual offenses. The fact finders in Mandate
Palestine, unlike lay English jurors, were professional judges whose
expertise and qualifications might have been expected to call for fewer
restrictions on the evidence available to them. The standard that had
originally been intended as a cautionary warning to a lay jury was strictly
applied by professional judges in a nonjury colonial system. The judicial
rhetoric bolstering the rule repeatedly emphasized the corroborative
importance of forensic and medical evidence. However, a close reading of
cases in Part 5 demonstrates that the Palestine judiciary shaped the rule as
an inflexible demand to corroborate the perpetrator's identity as well as
the sexual act, thus significantly hindering the possibility of obtaining
convictions, especially when the victim was a child. I examine the
operation of the corroboration rule in Mandate Palestine as a site of
political and cultural encounter between the British rulers and the
inhabitants of that land. If the early development of the English rule
represents a mistrust of women, its application in Palestinian cases reflects
a suspicion of the inhabitants of the "East," especially of children. This
socially and culturally embedded evidentiary practice reflected British
rulers' biases and demonstrated a gap between their declared purposes-of
protecting women and children and imposing superior moral values-and
their actions.
II. SEX OFFENSES IN MANDATE PALESTINE
The British who occupied Palestine in 1918 changed both the
substantive criminal law (imposing a new regime of sexual regulation) and
6. On the adoption of this standard in India, see Elizabeth Kolsky, "The Body Evidencing the
Crime": Rape on Trial in Colonial India, 1860-1947, 22 GENDER & HIST. 109 (2010). On its adoption
in Canada and Australia, see Constance Backhouse, The Doctrine of Corroboration in Sexual Assault
Trials in Early Twentieth-Century Canada and Australia, 26 QUEEN's L. J. 297 (2001).
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rules of criminal procedure and evidence. Prior to British control,
Palestine had been part of the Ottoman Empire, whose 1858 Penal Code
(revised twice, in 1911 and 1914) was based on the Code Napoleon, and
the criminal procedure and evidence in the region had been controlled by
the 1858 Code of Criminal Procedure, replicated from the French code,8
which did not demand corroboration.9 Ottoman law was not immediately
discarded upon British occupation; rather, the British gradually replaced
existing laws and modified the legal system into a common-law
jurisdiction. Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council (1922) created a
mechanism to prevent automatic application of English common law and
provided that it should "be in force so far only as the circumstances of
Palestine and its inhabitants and the limits of His Majesty's jurisdiction
permit and subject to such qualification as local circumstances render
necessary." The British constructed a system clearly molded after the
common-law model, but it was not a simulacrum. For example, they
forwent a fundamental feature of the English system, the jury trial, the
adoption of which would have necessitated entrusting the subjects of
imperial rule with judicial decisions. The British in Palestine neither
directly applied common-law rules of evidence nor followed the Indian
Evidence Act of 1872 but adopted a much more limited set of evidence
rules that left many of the Ottoman provisions of the Mejelle (the civil
code of obligations inspired by Islamic law) in effect. The result was an
Anglicized system, with traces of Islamic and French elements.'o
The overall structure of the Ottoman civil court system was retained by
the British but with some modifications." That structure was a dual one:
religious courts for each recognized denomination having jurisdiction over
matters of personal status (most notably, marriage and divorce), and
secular courts that heard civil and criminal matters. The civil court system
was two-tiered. Lower courts handled petty criminal and civil cases, and
district courts oversaw more serious criminal and civil matters and also
7. Norman Bentwich, The New Criminal Code for Palestine, 20 J. COMp. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 71
(1938). The Mejelle, which set evidentiary rules for civil matters, however, was influenced by Islamic
principles. Omri Paz, Crime, Criminals, and the Ottoman State: Anatolia Between the Late 1830s and
the Late 1860s (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University).
8. RICHARD VOLGER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005).
9. By 1918, criminal matters in the Ottoman Empire were not subject to the two-eyewitnesses
demand. L. Sebba, The Requirement of Corroboration in Sex Offences, 3 ISRAEL L. REv. 67, 75
(1968). The Ottomans relied heavily on the concept of competency to weed out unreliable witnesses.
Article 146 of the Ottoman Criminal Procedure Code provided that "[t]he accused person's
ascendants, descendants, brothers, sisters, collaterals in the same degree, wife or husband, even when
divorced, cannot be called or heard as witnesses, but the admission of their evidence is not a ground
for quashing the case when neither the prosecutor, the civil claimant or the accused have taken
objection to the evidence being heard." The English translation of this article appears in S. G.
KERMACK, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN PALESTINE 131 (1928).
10. ASSAF LIKHOVSKI, LAW AND IDENTITY IN MANDATE PALESTINE 23 (2006).
I1. Palestine Order in Council, Art. 39 (1922).
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heard appeals of lower court decisions. In the British reworking, appeals
from the district courts were taken to the Supreme Court in Jerusalem,
sitting in a tribunal that included first at least two, and later at least one,
senior British judge.12 In certain civil matters the judgments of the
Supreme Court could be reviewed by the Privy Council in London.
The sex offenses discussed in this Article were typically initiated by
complaint to the police, who conducted an investigation. Subsequently, the
charges and the investigatory materials were brought before a local
magistrate who held a preliminary inquiry and decided whether the case
should be tried at the district level." Sex offenses, the punishment for
which exceeded three years' imprisonment, were triable in district court
before the British president of the court and two other judges.'4 The
witnesses in these cases thus gave a triple account: before the police, the
magistrate, and the district court. The criminal files examined for this
Article sometimes contained materials from each procedural stage (the
statements to the police were submitted at the preliminary investigation,
the records of the latter were frequently attached to the district court file,
and the transcript of the district court proceeding was customarily attached
to appeals to the Supreme Court). When it was established in 1948, the
State of Israel largely retained the structure of the Mandate judicial
system." Unfortunately, most Mandate court files did not survive the
transfer to the new administration, apparently through disorder and
neglect. However, I was able to locate sixty-nine files at the Israel
Archives. Most of these materials had not yet been catalogued and were
being made available by the archive for the first time.
The British presented themselves as the protectors of women and
children in the land entrusted to their care by a League of Nations
mandate, although their aspirations for reform were consciously
constrained by considerations of local norms and customs.16 The British
regulated matters such as child labor and child marriage,' 7 and their
ideology was also expressed by their criminal legislation. Part of their
civilizing mission was to institute a new regulatory regime of sexuality,
distinct from the Ottoman one, as was manifested in different legal
terminology and categories pertaining to sex offenses. The Ottomans
12. An Ordinance Relating to the Constitution and Jurisdiction of Certain Courts in Palestine,
Art. 3 (1924, revised 1935).
13. An Ordinance to Regulate the Procedure in Criminal Cases within the Jurisdiction of the
Court of Criminal Assize or of the District Court, Art. 3 (1924).
14. An Ordinance Relating to the Constitution and Jurisdiction of Certain Courts in Palestine, Art.
11(3) (1924).
15. One of the significant changes it made was to terminate the linkage to the Privy Council as the
superior hearer of appeal. ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN, THE JUDGES OF THE LAND 50 (1980).
16. LIKHOVSKI, supra note 10, at 85.
17. Id. at 13.
1892014]
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categorized sex offenders as "persons who violate honour,"' 8 whereas the
British framed sex offenses as "offences against women and children and
against decency"' 9 and, later, as "offences against morality." 20 "Honor" in
this context is a patriarchal value that defines a woman's virtue as
essential to the men of her family.21 "Decency" and "morality" also focus
on the regulation of sexuality but suggest a different set of concerns, the
enforcement of more-universal moral values within society.
One significant change in substantive law was in the treatment of same-
sex sexual activity. The British introduced the offense of "sodomy"
(committed with "any person") as a criminalized activity distinct from
rape (committed on a female).22 The purged language of the Ottoman
Penal Code (OPC) blurred gender differences, and the same provision
applied to both male and female victims. 23  Consensual homosexual
relations between adults, not banned by the OPC, were criminalized by the
British in Palestine. 24 The legal ban on homosexuality was a long-standing
British norm.25 Regardless of recurring policy statements about reluctance
to interfere with local norms and customs, same-sex sexual activity,
consensual or not, was criminalized across the colonies of the British
Empire.26
The wish to regulate sexuality stood in conflict with another British
notion, the fear of perjury by colonial subjects. Michael McDonnell, chief
justice of Palestine (1927-1936), described the conflicting attitudes of his
fellow judges regarding the enactment of a prohibition against sodomy: 27
18. Part Ill of the Ottoman Penal Code "[s]ets forth the punishment for persons who violate
honour." OTTOMAN PENAL CODE, at Part Ill (John A. Bucknill & Haig S. Utidjian trans., 1913)
[hereinafter OPC].
19. CLAO, supra note 2.
20. The title adopted in the Criminal Code Ordinance (1936) [hereinafter CCO]. The CCO was
published in September 1936, and went into effect in February 1937.
21. Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a
Woman's Sensitive Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 287, 298 (1997).
22. Section 2 of the CLAO repealed articles 197-200 and 202 of the OPC and the remaining
articles continued to coexist until the enactment of the 1936 CCO.
23. Article 198 of the OPC read as follows: "If a man does the abominable act to a person, that is
to say violates his honour, by force he is placed in kyurek temporarily." The main purpose of this
phrasing may have been to avoid the discussion of same-sex relations. See DROR ZEEVI, PRODUCING
DESIRE: CHANGING SEXUAL DISCOURSE IN THE OTTOMAN MIDDLE EAST, 1500-1900, at 73 (2006).
24. Section 152(2)(c) of the CCO.
25. Same-sex sexual activity was outlawed long before the Victorian Criminal Law Amendment
Act of 1885, which set forth various categories of sex offenses. The roots of the prohibition date back
to a 1533 Henrician statute adapted around the eighteenth century to criminalize homosexual activity.
HARRY G. COCKS, NAMELESS OFFENCES: HOMOSEXUAL DESIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 17
(2003).
26. Michael Kirby, The Sodomy Offence: England's Least Lovely Criminal Law Export?, I J.
COMMONWEALTH CRIM. L. 22, 28 (2011). The gap between claims of adherence to a "status quo" and
the actual execution of legal, political, and social changes was typical of British imperial routine, in
Palestine as well as in India and Africa. ROBSON, supra note 1, at 9, 44-45.
27. Letter from Michael McDonnell to the high commissioner (Mar. 7, 1929) (on file with Israel
State Archives RG 2/M/265/7) [hereinafter McDonnell's letter]. The letter contains remarks regarding
[Vol 26:185190
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The clause as it stands assimilates the law to that of England.
Judge Kermack states that he thinks the chance of making false
charges given by this clause is probably greater than the good that
might be done by it.
Judge Copland, on the other hand, considers that it is time that
something should be done to stop the offence of sodomy which is
appallingly rife, so he states, in his District amongst all classes. He
writes that he has tried 40 cases of this offence or attempt to
commit it last year. Others with longer experience than I have of
the East will say whether there is a danger of legislating in advance
of public opinion.28
McDonnell postulates that better balance between progressive British
legislation and local norms might be suggested by others with longer
experience of "the East." He uses this vague geographical term, rather
than specifically mention Mandate Palestine. The choice of the word
"East" not only insinuates an array of ideas about the Orient, "its
sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its habits of
inaccuracy, its backwardness," 29 but also a hierarchical distinction
between the British and their Palestinian subjects. The judges'
contradictory attitudes toward the regulation of sodomy reveal manifold
tensions regarding the inexplicable and shadowy "East," laden with
images of uncontrolled sexuality, as expressed in "appallingly rife"
sodomy and deceitful, extortion-minded locals of undeveloped mentality
who were prone to make illicit use of the precious gift of British law. The
redefinition of sexual offenses allowed the British to present themselves as
the protectors of women and children and the bearers of high moral
values, a maneuver of substantial declaratory value, both for British and
international public opinion and for the local community in Palestine.30
The split between the declared goals of regulating sexuality and protecting
women and children on the one hand, and deep distrust toward the
complaints of locals about sexual assault on the other, is embodied in the
practice of corroboration. To decipher the complex social and cultural
sphere surrounding this evidentiary practice, it is first necessary to travel
back a few centuries, to the early modem roots of the concept of
corroboration.
the suggested criminal code. Islamic texts regarded consensual homosexual practices as transgressive,
but it was debatable whether they were punishable under Ottoman law. The OPC, however,
criminalized sexual violence and the abuse of minors. Dror Zeevi, Changes in Legal-Sexual
Discourses: Sex Crimes in the Ottoman Empire, 16 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 219, 226 (2001).
28. McDonnell's letter, supra note 27, at 12.
29. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 205 (1979).
30. On the British use of progressive legislation for international, domestic, and local political
purposes, see LIKHOVSKI, supra note 10, at ch. 4.
1912014]
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III. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
A long British common-law tradition pointed to the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in proving sexual crimes and demanded evidentiary
precautions that would prevent false convictions on the basis of fabricated
charges. Any conviction that rested on a single person's testimony with no
supporting evidence could create doubts.' Sex offenses, however, stood
out as particularly problematic to prove. The renowned judge Sir Matthew
Hale referred to both rape and witchcraft as
crimes that give the greatest difficulty . .. wherein many times
persons are really guilty, yet such an evidence, as is satisfactory to
prove it, can hardly be found; and on the other side persons really
innocent may be entangled under such presumptions, that many
times carry great probabilities of guilt. 32
Hale also maintained that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and
hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho
never so innocent."33 His assertion later became the target of much
criticism on the grounds of inaccuracy 34 and prejudice against female
accusers.35 The criticism for inaccuracy was double edged. First, critics
called the fear of false convictions unwarranted, pointing to the low
prosecution rate and to the high acquittal rate in rape cases during Hale's
time.36 Second, accusations of sexual assault were not that easy to make,
as the accuser was likely to be embarrassed or criticized and scrutinized
for sexual frivolity.37 Another deterrent to bringing rape charges in early
modem England was the expense, as the accusing party had to bear the
costs of legal action. 8 Given all these obstacles, Laurie Edelstein doubts
that rape was a crime that would have been chosen for malicious
charges.39
Yet those who have criticized Hale as showing "concern for the male
defendant and a prejudicial attitude toward his female accuser" 40 or, more
31. SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 150 (3d ed. 1769).
32. 2 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 290 (1736). For more about Hale on
rape, see also GILBERT GEIS & IVAN BUNN, A TRIAL OF WITCHES: A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
wITCHCRAFT PROSECUTION 121 (1997).
33. 1 HALE, supra note 32, at 631.
34. CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE, CARNAL CRIMES: SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW IN CANADA, 1900-1975,
at 171 (2008); Gilbert Geis, Lord Hale, Witches, and Rape, 5 BRIT. J.L & SoC'Y 26 (1978).
35. Kolsky, supra note 6, at 111.
36. Id; Geis, supra note 34, at 27; GARTHINE WALKER, CRIME, GENDER AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 55 (2003); Laurie Edelstein, An Accusation Easily to be Made? Rape and
Malicious Prosecution in Eighteenth-Century England, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351, 362 (1998).
37. Geis, supra note 34, at 27; Edelstein, supra note 36, at 364.
38. Id. at 373.
39. Id at 375.
40. Kolsky, supra note 6, at 111.
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blatantly, as a "misogynist" 41 may have unjustly caricatured his analysis.
Judging a seventeenth-century jurist by feminist standards formed 400
years later is clearly biased and oversimplifies Hale's argument. It should
be remembered that Hale also cautioned against false convictions in
witchcraft cases, in which most defendants were women. Hale did not
state that female accusers in rape cases should be assumed to have made
false accusations (in fact, he listed several rules that enhanced the
possibility of achieving convictions in cases of rape under the
contemporary law).42 He also made clear that female victims of rape were
competent witnesses.43 His view was that children "of tender years," who
were too young to take an oath (the testimony of children under fourteen
was generally inadmissible), should still be heard by the court; however,
their testimony should be corroborated." Whereas Hale's use of
corroboration was aimed at giving children more leeway to testify,
application of the rule in the courts of Mandate Palestine resulted in
routine rejection of their testimony. Notably, Hale's recommendation of
corroboration was limited to witnesses who were children. He creatively
constructed corroboration as a device allowing their otherwise
inadmissible testimony. In Hale's opinion, the secretive nature of the
offense justified a departure from the standard evidentiary mode. Yet Hale
differentiated between competence and credibility and asserted that the
latter should be a matter for the jury. He also listed circumstances that
might support the credibility of the witness or raise doubts about her
reliability. These early modem criteria took root in English common law
and persisted for many years to come:
For instance, if the witness be of good fame, if she presently
discovered the offense made pursuit after the offender,45 shewed
circumstances and signes of the injury, whereof many are of that
nature, that only women are the most proper examiners and
inspectors, if the place, wherein the fact was done, was remote
from people, inhabitants or passengers, if the offender fled for it;
41. Geis, supra note 34, at 27.
42. For example, despite the Elizabethan prohibition against "carnally know[ing]" a girl under ten
years of age, 18 Eliz. Ch. 7 (1576), Hale maintained that the age of consent was twelve. Although the
conviction of rape demanded proof of penetration, Hale asserted that anyone present, aiding and
abetting, should be punished like the principal offender; he also maintained that a consent obtained by
threat of death is no consent, that despite the presumption of matrimonial consent, the Crown may
indict a man for prostituting his wife, that a woman can bring charges of rape against a man who
compelled her to marry him once the marriage was dissolved, and that the Crown and the victim's
relatives may bring charges even when the woman gives her consent after the rape. I HALE, supra
note 32, at 628. See also Edelstein, supra note 36, at 356.
43. 1 HALE, supra note 32, at 633.
44. Id. at 634.
45. The requirement for immediate complaint in rape cases was reiterated by other early modem
writers. See MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE: CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE JUSTICES
OF THE PEACE, As WELL IN AND OUT OF THE SESSIONS GATHERED 392 (1715).
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these and the like are concurring evidences to give greater
probability to her testimony, when proved by others as well as
herself.
But on the other side, if she concealed the injury for any
considerable time after she had opportunity to complain, if the
place, where the fact was supposed to be committed, were near to
inhabitants, or common recourse or passage of passengers, and she
made no outcry when the fact was supposed to be done, when and
where it is probable she might be heard by others; these and the
like circumstances carry a strong presumption, that her testimony
is false or feigned.46
Considering that it was possible to err in both directions-false
conviction or unjustified acquittal-Hale clearly preferred to acquit the
real perpetrator than to spill the blood of the innocent. He cautioned
against discretion clouded by the abhorrent nature of the crime and false
witnesses.47 He did not presume that all female victims were liars but
merely considered the possibility that some accusers might lie. In short,
Hale recognized that the secretive nature of rape entailed a special
challenge of proof. Although Hale himself advocated for corroboration
only with regard to children's testimony, his articulation of the general
probative problem and of the criteria of reliability underpinned the
corroboration rule for adult victims as well in centuries to come.
The troublesome issue of proving rape continued to occupy English
jurists throughout the modem era. Victorian treatment of sexual offenses
reflected a transformation of early modem ideas and included changes in
the substantive law, criminal procedure, and evidence that facilitated proof
and conviction in cases of rape. Juries' reluctance to convict was softened
by the removal of the death penalty and by allowing lesser charges to be
brought together with the primary charge of rape.48 The Victorian courts
developed an interpretative framework narrowing the notion of women's
consent, including limiting inquiry about the victim's sexual past and
demanding less resistance on her part, thus broadening the scope of
situations that were considered nonconsensual and that warranted
conviction for rape.49 Proof was also facilitated by the abandonment of the
46. 1 HALE, supra note 32, at 633. William Blackstone drew on Hale in his analysis of the
evidence required to prove the crime of rape. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND (1769).
47. "[W]e may be more cautious upon trials of offenses of this nature, wherein the court and jury
may with so much ease be imposed upon without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the
offense many times transporting the judge and jury with so much indignation, that they are over hastily
carried to the conviction of the person accused thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of
malicious and false witnesses." I HALE, supra note 32, at 636.
48. MARTIN J. WIENER, MEN OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE, MANLINESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
vICTORIAN ENGLAND 91 (2004).
49. Id. at 92.
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requirement that emission of semen be showno. Another significant
change was the conceptual shift from the notion of "against her will" to
"without her consent," the former being a concealed element and,
therefore, hard to prove." The result was that, despite expanding legal
representation, the likelihood of conviction rose markedly in comparison
with earlier times (although conviction rates remained relatively low for
some years into the nineteenth century).52 Although Victorian judges
facilitated proof of rape, complainants in sexual offense cases continued to
be scrutinized more closely than victims of other offences, and their
testimony still required corroboration.
It is noteworthy that when the charges related to same-sex sexual
activity, the requirement for corroboration of the testimony of the
accomplice and that of the victim coalesced. Consensual homosexual
relations were criminalized in Victorian England. The rationale behind
the demand for corroboration in other sex offenses, the enhanced danger
of false charges brought about by the difficulty of proving intimate
relations, was especially relevant to same-sex activity. However, in cases
of homosexuality, an additional rationale applied: the witness was also an
accomplice, a partner to a criminal liaison, who might want to exaggerate
the actions of the defendant to shift blame away from himself.
Homosexuality was an offense in which the partner was simultaneously an
accomplice and a victim. It is not surprising that one of the important
precedents concerning corroboration emerged from a charge of "gross
indecency," a term that was widely interpreted to mean homosexual
activity. 54 In that case, Mr. Baskerville was charged with committing
indecency with several boys, and one may surmise that the homosexuality
charges were a practical substitute for more severe sexual charges that
could not be proved. The case of R. v. Baskerville (1916), which
influenced the British Commonwealth for decades, held that corroboration
must come from an independent source and that it should implicate the
accused by confirming in some material particular not only the evidence
that the crime had been committed but also that the accused had
committed it.56 The rationale behind the demand for corroboration,
explicitly voiced in cases of homosexuality, was hidden and disguised in
50. Id. at 89.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 77.
53. See supra note 25.
54. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 69, § 11.
55. COCKS, supra note 25, at 33. Baskerville precursors include the cases of Tate and Meunier,
which acknowledged the well-settled practice of corroboration, although opinion diverged about
whether conviction subsequent to a failure to caution the jury amounted to miscarriage of justice
justifying a reversal. R. v. Tate, [1908] 2 K.B. 680; R. v. Meunier, [1894) 2 Q.B. 415.
56. Backhouse, supra note 6, at 300; R. v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K.B. 658.
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cases of sexual assault-the victim as some sort of an accomplice, a
willing party in the commission of the crime.s" The demand for
corroboration, which implies categorical distrust of complainants of sexual
assaults, is another manifestation of the suspicion underlying their
treatment.
By the time the British occupied Palestine, the elements of reliability
listed by Hale had become rooted in English law.58 It became the practice
to warn the jury about the necessity of corroborating the testimony of the
alleged victim.5 9 The requirement for corroboration was not essential by
law but was required in practice, and it spread with the British Empire to
other jurisdictions that adhered to the common law, including Mandate
Palestine.6' Hale's mistrust of female complainants is just one example of
the ways procedural and evidentiary rules encode social bias. In Palestine,
this evidentiary tool was infused with a new dimension of bias that
designated legal participants in some categories as less worthy than others.
IV. CORROBORATION IN MANDATE PALESTINE
Evidence was one of the first issues targeted after the League of Nations
granted Britain the mandate to rule Palestine. The imperial policy pledging
to preserve the legal "status quo" and to accommodate local circumstances
was stressed with relation to substantive law but much less so in respect to
procedural law.62 The Evidence Ordinance that went into effect in the
colony contained a mere thirteen articles (far fewer than the exhaustive
57. For an analysis of the elements of rape as a reflection of defenses available to women who
were charged in cases of fornication and adultery, see Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1998).
58. The 25th edition of Archbold, published in 1922, states criteria similar to those listed by Hale
two centuries earlier: "If the witness is of good fame; if she presently discovered the offence, and
made search for the offender; if the party accused fled for it; these and the like are concurring
circumstances which give greater probability to her evidence. But, on the other hand, if she is of evil
fame, and stands unsupported by the testimony of others; if she concealed the injury for any
considerable time after she had opportunity to complain; if the place where the act was alleged to have
been committed were such that it was possible she might have been heard, and she made no outcry;
these and the like circumstances carry a strong but not conclusive presumption that her testimony is
false or feigned." JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD ET AL., ARCHBOLD'S PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND
PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 1022 (26th ed. 1922).
59. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
117 (1955). By that time, corroboration was required not only for rape but for any sexual offenses
including indecent assault and homosexuality. Id. at 17.
60. ARCHBOLD ET AL., supra note 58.
61. Hale's phrasing continued to echo in Palestine's judgments. See CrimA 118/42 Abu Zeid v.
A.G., ASC. 472, [1942], at I ("Rape is one of those offences a charge of which it is very easy to make
and which, although entirely innocent, an accused may find it very difficult to refute."); CrimA 54/38
Shafiq George Halaby v. A.G. [1938] ("[C]harges could be made which it might be very difficult for
an innocent person to refute."); ISAIRG 30/Law 268/54, CrimA 54/38 Shafiq Halaby v. A.G. [1938],
at 3.
62. As to this policy elsewhere in the British empire, see James Q. Whitman, Western Legal
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167 articles of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872).63 It declared that "all
persons are competent to give evidence in all cases."' The ordinance also
maintained that "[n]o judgment shall be given in any case on the evidence
of a single witness."65 This requirement mandated that all testimony in
both civil and criminal cases be corroborated (unless it was satisfactorily
proven that the criminal accused made a "free and voluntary"
admission).66
The blanket demand for corroboration did not exist in English law, and
the motivation for such a demand in Palestine was probably British fear of
widespread perjury by the local population.6 7 In the words of the attorney
general, "I do not consider that the standard of credibility of witnesses in
Palestine is very high."68 The drop in conviction rates during the Arab
revolt was the backdrop for an amendment that obliterated the statutory
corroboration requirement in criminal cases. 69  Crossing out the
corroboration requirement in criminal cases could have resulted in
enhanced judiciary discretion. However, judges continued to apply
English precedents and to demand that single-witness testimony in sexual
offenses be corroborated.70 The British judges did not perceive the
amendment as an opportunity for freer evaluation of testimony but, rather,
as a signal that English case law should be applied. By letter, Harry
Herbert Trusted, the chief justice of the Supreme Court at the time of the
publication of the amendment, instructed lower-court judges as follows:
I would draw your attention to the notice published in Gazette No.
725 of the 4th of October, bringing into operation the Law of
Evidence (Amendment) Ordinance, 1936.
Prima facie, the effect of this would seem to be that English
Common Law of Evidence will apply in criminal cases.
I think it well that the attention of Palestinian Judges and
63. Evidence Ordinance No. II of 1922, No. 13 of 1924, No. 28 of 1924, No. 17 of 1928, and No.
19 of 1928 [hereinafter Evidence Ordinance].
64. Evidence Ordinance, Art. 3. The ordinance contained two exceptions: 1) parents and children
and 2) spouses were not competent to testify against each other.
65. Id. at Art. 6. For a review of the Arab revolt, see Matthew Hughes, The Banality of Brutality:
British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39, 124 ENG. HIST.
REV. 313 (2009).
66. Sebba, supra note 9, at 75.
67. Id. It is also possible that a British misreading of the Ottoman two-witnesses rule and a wish
to adopt Mejelle's sufficiency standards led to the adoption of the general corroboration requirement.
68. Id, a fine example of English understatement.
69. ELIAHU HARNON, LAW OF EVIDENCE 5 § 2 (1977). Evidence Ordinance No. 68 of 1936
replaced section 6 with the following provision: "Corroboration in civil cases. 6. No judgment shall be
given in any civil case on the evidence of a single witness unless such evidence is uncontradicted or is
corroborated by some other material evidence which, in the opinion of the Court, is sufficient to
establish the truth." The amended ordinance demanded corroboration in civil cases only and was put
into effect on October 11, 1937.
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Magistrates should be called to this notice and, in cases where you
think it necessary, the general provisions of the English Law
explained, particular regard being had as to necessity of
corroboration of an accomplice, of a young child, and of the
prosecutrix in sexual offences."
Justice Trusted, however, in an instruction that sounds like a default to
familiar rules, misstated the English law, 72 which, as noted, merely
obligated a cautionary warning to the jury against accepting the testimony
of a single witness unless it was supported by other incriminating
evidence. In England, facts are found by laymen, the jurors, who give
unreasoned verdict. Corroboration, like many other common law
evidentiary rules, was created to facilitate the processing of the evidence
by laypersons. It is not obvious why a jury-related evidentiary concept
should be grafted onto local law when the fact finders were professional
judges. Corroboration, even in England, was not mandatory, and a jury
properly directed could still have convicted solely on the basis of
uncorroborated testimony.
Although the written law, as it was amended in 1936, made no such
explicit demand, the Mandate judges routinely required corroboration in
cases of sexual offenses. They presumed that corroboration was
mandatory, and the question became what could constitute the necessary
corroboration and what could not.
According to Hale, the immediacy of a complaint lent it more
probability, and vice versa. The courts of Mandate Palestine considered a
delayed complaint less credible than an immediate one but did not regard
immediacy as corroboration.74 In other words, the criterion of immediacy
could be used only to devalue the complainant, not to constitute
corroboration. It was usually assumed that the corroboration had to be
71. I found the original undated letter to the presidents of the District Court and the chief
magistrates in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus, and Tel Aviv, marked No. JiI/0, affixed to p. 84 of a
library copy (University of Haifa KA792.P3 1943) of THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN
PALESTINE (H. Kantrovitch ed., 1943). The volume bears the stamps "the Supreme Court Jerusalem
Feb. 1943" and "The District Court Haifa Palestine I Mar. 1943," indicating that it was used by the
Mandate judges.
72. This misapprehension was also expressed in Justice Trusted's judgments. For example: "It is
quite clear that according to English Law which for this purpose now applies, in order to convict for
sexual offences, the evidence of the complainant must be, to some extent, corroborated." ISA/RG 30/
Law 268/54, CrimA 54/38 Shafiq Halaby v. A.G. [1938], at 3.
73. The statutory corroboration requirement in cases of procurement of women by threats, false
pretenses, or administering drugs to obtain or facilitate intercourse, Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 69, §§ 2-4, was repealed in 1994. In some exceptional cases the Court of
Criminal Appeal refrained from quashing a conviction despite the lack of warning. Sebba, supra note
9, at 77.
74. The expectation of immediate complaint presumes a "normal" reaction by rape victims and
ignores the various reasons that may deter a rape victim from immediately reporting the crime. Yuval
Merin, A Feminist Perspective on Evidence Law: The Gendered Truth and the Silencing of the
Different Voice, 16 HAMISHPAT 97, 108 n.39 (2011).
75. One extreme example is the case of Rachel Levine, who was separated from her friends by
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external to the testimony of the victim. The Mandate judges clarified that
identification of the rapist by the victim in an identification parade' 6 or the
complainant's statements to others also constituted insufficient
corroboration:
Corroboration may of course be found in the appearance of the
prosecutrix, the state of her clothes, the result of an examination by
a medical man, or the conduct or statement of the prisoner.
Evidence of a complaint made by the girl or woman shortly after
the alleged offence is not the required corroboration of her story as
it does not come from an independent quarter. Putting it in other
words she cannot corroborate herself.77
Medical reports and forensic evidence figured prominently in the
rhetoric related to corroboration. Physical evidence "spoke for itself," and
scientific evidence was seemingly objective, unconnected to witnesses of
suspicious reliability, and therefore particularly probative. Furthermore,
such evidence fit well into the colonial narrative of the British as the
avatars of progress. Some judges explicitly stated that
[i]n rape cases the most usual and most important corroborative
evidence is that of a doctor . . .. [O]ne would expect if her story is
true, medical evidence showing that intercourse had in fact taken
place; evidence of stains of semen on her underclothes; evidence of
bruises on her thighs and other parts of her body when she resisted
and struggled. If a doctor did examine her and found no such signs,
it would be very strong evidence indeed to discredit her
complaint.78
Yet a close reading of rape cases demonstrates that even ample medical
and forensic evidence was often insufficient to corroborate the victim's
testimony.79 Poor record survival makes comprehensive statistical
analyses impossible. However, I was able to find sixty-nine rape and
sodomy cases (sixty-seven court cases and two police files) that were
heard either in the District or in the Supreme Court. The majority of the
cases (forty-one) involved sexual assaults of minors. The victim was a
female in thirty-three cases and a male in thirty-six cases (the remaining
case involved bestiality). Examination of the actual implementation of the
armed assailants and gang-raped behind some bushes for thirty to forty minutes. When Rachel was
allowed to return to her friends, they did not need to ask her what had happened. Rachel reported the
incident upon their return home. The minority judge hearing the appeal, however, found her testimony
lacking credibility because she did not make a statement to her friends who saw her immediately after
the rape. ISA/RG 30/Law 441/31, CrimA 31/47 Khatem & Ahmed v. A.G. [1947], at 12 (Acting
Justice Curry's minority opinion).
76. ISA/RG 30/ Law 268/54, CrimA 54/38 Shafiq Halaby v. A.G. [1938], at 4.
77. ISA/RG 30/Law 441/31, CrimA 31/47 Khatem & Ahmed v. A.G. [1947].
78. ISA/RG 30/Law 441/31, CrimA 31/47 Khatem & Ahmed v. A.G. [1947] (Acting Justice
Curry's minority opinion).
79. For a similar observation regarding Australia, see Backhouse, supra note 6, at 311.
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doctrine of corroboration reveals recurring gaps between the narrative of
instituting progressive criminal law, protecting women and children, and
relying on scientific evidence on the one hand, and on the other, the low
trust of local complainants and insufficiency of medical and forensic
evidence as corroborating evidence.
V. INFLEXIBLE DEMAND FOR CORROBORATION (NOTWITHSTANDING
MEDICAL/FORENSIC EVIDENCE)
Jamila was the seven-year-old daughter of a Haifa shoemaker who had
his own shop near the Istiklal mosque downtown."o On the afternoon of
June 14, 1938, while Jamila was playing outside with her three-year-old
brother, Yusef, and another boy, a man approached the children. He gave
Jamila two piasters and told her to accompany him to buy sweets for her
brother. He then took her outside the area, to a spot near a Jewish
neighborhood, put her in a pit, and raped her. Jamila's parents noticed her
unusual appearance upon her return and took her to be medically
examined. Jamila recognized her rapist as Mahmoud Khalil, a man who
sometimes visited the family's neighbors. He was arrested and charged
with rape. Mahmoud, a Jenin resident, was a chauffer and electrician by
his own account and was employed by the Haifa lawyer Fuad Atallah,
who provided him with food in lieu of wages. He denied the rape charge
and claimed an alibi, which was rejected by the District Court.8 ' The
evidence included the testimony of Jamila and her parents, the testimony
of a boy (too young to be sworn) who saw the accused taking Jamila by
the hand on the day in question and who later picked him out of an
identification parade, and a physician who testified about the physical
injury caused by the rape.82 Despite the significant medical evidence, the
conviction of the accused was nevertheless overturned by the Supreme
Court for insufficient corroboration.83 There was no doubt that little Jamila
was raped. The severe injuries she sustained necessitated surgery. The
issue that required corroboration was the identity of the accused. Jamila's
identification of her attacker was not considered sufficient corroboration
nor was the testimony of an unswom boy. The medical evidence could
affirm the occurrence of rape but not the identity of the rapist.
Similar reasoning underlay the acquittal of Mohammad Youssef,
originally from the Jenin area, who was charged with committing sodomy
80. Unless otherwise mentioned, the details of the cases described in this article are taken from
the legal files in the Israel Archives. For this case, see the contents of ISA/RG 30/269/79, CrimA
79/38 Khalil v. A.G. [1938].
81. His employer testified in his defense at the hearing in the District Court and also argued
before the Supreme Court in his appeal.
82. See the transcripts of Cr.C 94/38 (Haifa District Court) in ISAIRG 30/269/79.
83. Judgment of the Supreme Court in CrimA 79/38.
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on eight-year-old Nizar, the son of his employer, a well-to-do Haifa
pharmacist.8' The events described by Nizar happened in the busy
pharmacy, where five people worked (Nizar's father, the father's brother,
and three other employees, including the accused). Nizar's mother
described Mohammad's position as that of "servant." He had started
working for the family when he was a boy himself (one of the disputed
issues at the trial was whether he was seventeen, as he claimed, or over
eighteen, as the prosecution argued; the court held the latter). At first, he
had also worked at the family's house, later working only at the pharmacy
as an errand boy. He was "promoted" to work in the storage room after a
new servant boy, a fifteen-year-old boy from Africa, replaced him in
running errands. This boy, also named Mohammed and, therefore, dubbed
by the family "the other Mohammad," later testified that he sometimes
saw Nizar and his brother sitting in the accused's lap while he was
teaching them the Arabic alphabet. The brothers grew up in a protective
environment. They did not go out much, and servants escorted them to
school and back. Only their mother and a servant helped them to get
dressed. In the words of Nizar's mother, "I permit no one to look after my
children except myself." Nizar, a first-year school pupil, asserted that the
accused sometimes took him and his younger brother to a back room in
the pharmacy in which medicines, bottles, and goods for sale were stored,
and, there, took off Nizar's pants and committed sodomy on him.
Mohammad Youssef had been employed by Nizar's father for eight years
and had known Nizar since he was a baby. Among the witnesses for the
prosecution were the boy, his parents, "the other Mohammad," who had
seen the accused playing with the children, and a doctor who examined
both the child (finding indications of sodomy) and the accused (to verify
his age and ability to commit the offense). Again, the conviction of the
Haifa District Court was quashed for insufficient corroboration. Medical
proof of the sex offense was not enough. The Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he fact that the mother saw bruises on the child is corroboration of an
offence having been committed, but not necessarily that the accused had
committed the offence."ss It did not even mention the medical evidence.
The identification of the accused, according to the court, remained
uncorroborated." It did not matter that Nizar could not have mistakenly
identified someone he had known since he was a baby. The concern
behind the insistence on corroboration was probably not the fear of an
honest mistake but rather of a deliberate lie. Despite the medical evidence,
the Supreme Court did "not think that there is corroboration of the child's
tale." Nizar's story was merely a "tale." The judgment further states that
84. ISA/RG 30/Law 269/71, CrimA 71/38 Mohammad Abdel Ghani v. A.G. [1938].
85. CrimA 71/38 in ISA/RG 30/Law 269/71, at 2.
86. See Cr.C 27/38 (Haifa District Court) and CrimA 71/38 in ISA/RG 30/Law 269/71.
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"[i]t may be that sodomy is one of the cases which are difficult to prove,
but difficulty in proof does not dispense with the proof." The built-in
mistrust that made sex offenses very hard to prove is presented here as
necessary for establishing facts.
Similar reasoning was voiced in a third case, that of Muhammad Agha,
who was charged with raping Samiha, his thirteen-year-old daughter.87
The family lived in the old city of Jaffa. Samiha's mother had died, and
her father had been divorced for a few years from his second wife, Zahara.
Muhammad's marriage to Zahara was part of an arrangement that included
the marriage of his son to Zahara's daughter. Following the divorce of
their parents, the son and the daughter-in-law had to move from the house
of the accused, and Zahara remarried her first husband. Familial tensions
formed the backdrop of the case. Samiha's household was poor and did
not have enough mattresses for everyone to sleep on, so Samiha had to
share a mattress with her father. Two younger brothers slept in the same
room with them. Samiha said that, one night, after arriving home late from
the cafe, her father took off her underwear and had intercourse with her. In
the morning, weeping, Samiha went to the house of her married brother
and told his wife about the incident. Her brother took her to a doctor and
then to the police station. The next day, a policeman took the girl to
another doctor for examination. The doctor who examined the girl at the
police's request testified that her hymen was recently ruptured. The first
doctor testified for the defense. His opinion was that her hymen had been
ruptured about fifteen days prior to his examination and that scratches in
the vagina could have been caused up to ten hours before the examination.
The District Court regarded the testimonies of both doctors as
corroboration (since the question was not when the girl's hymen was
ruptured but whether she was subjected to sexual intercourse). The picture
changed at the Supreme Court, however, which held that the medical
evidence alone was insufficient to corroborate the girl's complaint against
her father. The Supreme Court agreed the girl was probably sexually
assaulted but found insufficient corroboration of the identity of the
attacker.88 The father's admission that he slept on the same mattress with
his daughter was not regarded as sufficient corroboration. 89 Again,
corroboration was required not just of the sexual assault but also of the
identity of the perpetrator. The requirement that the identification made by
the victim be corroborated when the accused was familiar (here, the girl's
87. Cr.C 173/43 (Jaffa District Court) A.G. v. Agha [1943] in ISA/RG 30/Law 353/122.
88. The judgment in CrimA 122/43 Agha v. A.G. [1943], at 1, stated, "[lit was a most unfortunate
and deplorable matter in which the young daughter of the appellant, a girl of some 13 years of age, had
apparently been assaulted by some person. The question, of course which we have to consider, is
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own father) demonstrates that the court's concern was not the possibility
of mistaken identification but fabricated charges. Rape was very hard to
prosecute against the backdrop of such mistrust. The court stated that it
was "a most unfortunate and deplorable matter in which the young
daughter of the appellant, a girl of some 13 years of age, had apparently
been assaulted by some person." Despite its acceptance of Samiha's claim
that she had been raped, the court was reluctant to abandon the rule of
corroboration and believe her statement that her father was the perpetrator.
In this case, the court was offered an opportunity to moderate the rule, the
attorney general advocate urging that, as a matter of law, corroboration
was not required in cases of sexual offenses in Palestine. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument, saying "[t]hat may or may not be so, but we
are of opinion that, at the very least as a matter of practice followed, and
rightly followed, by Courts in these matters in this class of cases
corroboration implicating the accused is necessary." In all the cases
described above it seems clear that the Supreme Court did not regard
corroboration as limiting its capacity to convict the guilty but, rather, as a
justified and necessary tool.
Distressed appearance, disarranged clothes, or a bruised body, similarly,
could not confirm the rapist's identity, as illustrated by another case.
Batia, a fifteen and a half-year-old girl, complained against a man who
offered her a ride while she was waiting for a bus in Tel Aviv one night.
She accepted and climbed into the Dodge, driven by George Halaby from
Jaffa, a grocer's chauffer and a recidivist sex offender.90 Batia testified
that instead of driving her where she wanted to go, the man drove in the
direction of Jerusalem, stopped the car near an orange grove, and attacked
her. He threw her to the ground, beat her, and threatened her with a knife.
Batia struggled fiercely, and the man did not manage to complete the act.
After she returned with the attacker to Tel Aviv, a friend noticed her
injuries, her disorganized appearance, and her distress. Batia told her
friend what had happened, and the following morning he accompanied her
to the police station, where she gave a detailed description of the suspect
and the car. After George was arrested later that day, Batia identified him
in an identification parade and picked his car out of a group of vehicles
she was shown. Batia also underwent a medical examination. The
Supreme Court overturned George's conviction, explaining that the girl's
90. Two of George's four previous convictions were for sex offenses, and local newspapers had
reported on his violent treatment of women. On August 28, 1934, he reportedly offered a young
woman a ride, took her to a secluded spot, and attempted to assault her. On July 4, 1935, papers
reported that a Jewish immigrant from Germany committed suicide after Halaby raped her. Again, he
had picked her up and driven her to a distant place, where he attacked her. According to the news
account, the police officer who received the complaint knew immediately who Halaby was, since
many similar complaints about him had been made in the past. Driver Charged with Violence,
PALESTINE POST, Aug. 28, 1934, at 5; An Act of Rape Prompted a Suicide, DAVAR, July 4, 1935, at 8;
ISA/RG 30/ Law 268/54, CrimA 54/38 Shafiq Halaby v. A.G. [1938].
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statement to her friend that she could identify the suspect and the friend's
testimony that she was distressed and had a wound in her eye, disarranged
clothes, disordered hair, and blood on her hand were "not sufficient to
corroborate her story." 91 It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court
completely ignored the testimony of the physician who examined Batia
and found bruises and marks on her body. Batia's distress was not
considered corroboration of her assault; lack of distress on her part,
however, could have been seen as undermining her credibility. 92
A complainant could fare worse than facing mere disbelief. Such was
the fate of twelve-year-old Mohammad, from Acre, who complained about
a seventy-year-old man's attempt to sodomize him.93 Mohammad told the
inquiring magistrate that the suspect, a coachman, asked him to bring a
bucket of water for his horses. After the boy entered the stable, the suspect
closed the door and tried to attack him, but the boy shouted, and two men
came to the rescue. The boy was found to be too young to take an oath,
and he signed his statement with a thumbprint. Shortly thereafter,
Mohammad was transformed from accuser to accused and charged with
giving false evidence because his statement in court diverged from the one
he gave to the police in two details. He told the police that the suspect had
taken off his underpants by force and that the man lay on top of him. To
the magistrate, Mohammad said he had not been wearing underpants and
that the suspect had not touched his body. Mohammad was convicted in
Haifa District Court and sentenced to three years in a reformatory
institution for boys. The probation report discloses that Mohammad's
father, a fisherman and "a reputed drunkard," had deserted his family
about a year earlier after ongoing quarrels with the mother, who was "a
simple and ignorant woman" with "a bad indecent character of bad fame
and immoral reputation." The neglectful mother was rarely at home,
leaving her destitute children to "spend their time loitering about and
roaming streets." Shabby Mohammad had never been to school. He
worked at a cafe and "has a bad name from [sic] moral point of view" (i.e.
he lends himself to sodomites for sodomy and copulation acts). He
represents the destitute and spoiled type of boy." The Supreme Court
quashed the boy's conviction on several legal grounds and rescinded
Mohammad's detention order, but the judges clearly were unsatisfied with
the boy's prospects and ordered the authorities to further investigate
whether he should be placed under proper care.
This last case differs from the others I have discussed in illuminating
91. ISA/RG 30/ Law 268/54, CimA 54/38 Shafiq Halaby v. A.G. [1938], at 3.
92. As was the case in CrimA 31/47 Khatem & Ahmed v. A.G. (Acting Justice Curry's minority
opinion, at 12).
93. ISA/Law 2051, Cr.C 64/46 A.G. v. Ahmed Said ed Din [1946]; ISA/Law 2051, Cr.C 66/46
A.G. v. Mohammad el Moghraby, CrimA 47/46 Mohammad el Moghraby v. A.G. [1946].
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the cultural role of corroboration when individualized suspicions against
the complainants were lacking. Mohammad was disbelieved because of
his incoherence and possibly because of what was perceived to be his
murky social and familial background. From a complainant, he turned into
the accused in a perjury case (in which corroboration was not necessary).
The complainants in the other cases were disbelieved not for any personal
reasons but because they belonged to a category of witnesses that was, by
definition, suspicious: non-English children. Despite pervasive judicial
rhetoric about the corroborative significance of medical and forensic
evidence in cases of sexual assault, even when such evidence was
submitted, and even when no individualized suspicion against the
complainants existed, their stories were rejected as insufficient to convict.
The inflexible demand to corroborate the identity of the perpetrator
(notwithstanding the improbability of a mistake when the accused was a
familiar person) undermined the significance of the available medical and
forensic evidence.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The doctrine of corroboration as applied by the Palestinian judiciary
was more than a mere technical and neutral mode of ascertaining guilt in
hard-to-prove sex offense cases. It was also a means of establishing and
legitimizing colonial difference. At the explicit, rhetorical level, the
doctrine was a tool for promoting justice. Ostensibly, it was a transplant
from centuries-old English doctrine that aimed to prevent false
convictions. An emphasis on the corroborative significance of medical and
forensic evidence buttressed an image of the British as spreading progress
and modernization in the land entrusted to its care. The substantive law
explicitly defined protection of women and children as one of its primary
aims. However, an examination of actual practice reveals that
corroboration constructed local victims of sexual crimes as unreliable, and
convictions were very hard to obtain. An examination of the manner in
which the doctrine was applied in Palestine reveals that it was not a legal
transplant precisely replicating the original doctrine but, rather, that it
acquired its meaning in the context of the cross-cultural colonial
encounter.
Corroboration in sex offense cases was not a neutral evidentiary tool
but, rather, a tool for signifying "others," those belonging to a category of
social players who should not be believed. In England, those "others"
were females and homosexuals, and in the colonial context, they were
non-English, especially non-English children. Ostensibly, the requirement
of corroboration in cases of sexual assault was intended to solve the
evidentiary challenge posed by such hard-to-prove crimes. The probative
difficulty related to sexual charges should not be underestimated,
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especially in cases in which the only available evidence was the word of
the alleged victim against the word of the defendant. Even when sexual
relations were proven, it might be difficult to distinguish consensual from
nonconsensual activity. Although rape was defined as a "conduct" crime,
in which its mens rea did not require proof of specific intent, the accused's
understanding and interpretations of "consent" were crucial. Nevertheless,
he-said-she-said situations might occur in nonsexual crimes as well.
Perpetrators of all sorts of offenses try to avoid eyewitnesses as much as
possible. Yet the application of the evidentiary solution of corroboration
was not universal.
The difficulty of proving rape charges, most famously articulated by
Matthew Hale, does not necessarily disappear when medical and forensic
evidence is available. During the Mandate era, such evidence could prove
the occurrence of intercourse or bodily injuries but not the identity of the
offender, corroboration of which was required even when the sexual
assault was not disputed. The doctrine was not jurisprudentially essential
in Palestine. It is not self-evident that a cautionary warning to the jury
should have been transplanted to a nonjury system, run by professional
judges, in the form of a rigid rule with no exceptions. The special
insistence on corroboration in cases of sexual assault and not in other
types of hard-to-prove cases suggests that the reason lies not in purely
probative difficulties but, rather, elsewhere.
I suggest that the explanation lies partly in the social attributes of the
complainants. Mistrust of the complainant's testimony, as expressed
through the doctrine of corroboration (and also through the doctrine of
immediate complaint), has an apparent gendered aspect. In Mandate
Palestine, however, complainants were not predominantly female (in the
cases I was able to trace, thirty-six complainants were male and thirty-
three female). The Mandate British judges did not explicitly voice bias
against women for their supposed lack of veracity, unlike the American
evidence law scholar, John Henry Wigmore, whose writings warned
against the credibility of female complainants in sexual cases on the basis
of perverse psychological pathology.94 The Mandate judges did not refer
to Wigmore's theories, nor did they rely on Glanville Williams, who,
writing a few decades later, cautioned against female complainants who
might be motivated to cry rape by emotions of jealousy or revenge or who
were affected by pathological psychology. 95 These theories built on early
modern fears of women's illicit use of sexuality.
Originally based on a gendered prejudice against female complainants
in cases of sexual offenses, the rule of corroboration applied in the
94. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 736 § 3A (Little, Brown
1970) (1923). For a criticism of Wigmore, see BACKHOUSE, supra note 34, at 382.
95. Glanville Williams, Corroboration--Sexual Cases, CRIM. L. REV., Oct. 1962, at 662, 662.
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colonial setting of Mandate Palestine expressed prejudice concerning the
truthfulness of the locals, especially the young. British perceptions of the
locals could not help but affect what went on inside the courtroom, and, in
sexual offense cases, they heightened judges' lack of trust in complainants
and led to a stricter application of the rule of corroboration. It should be
noted that the British Mandate was created at an era of significant shift in
imperial policy. The aggrandizing colonialism that had characterized the
occupation of eighteenth-century India was no longer acceptable at the
beginning of the twentieth century, and the Mandate was shaped by a goal
of developing a local population not yet ripe for independence and
civilized self-government. 96 Norman Bentwich, the first attorney general
in Mandate Palestine, clearly regarded the system of mandates as intended
to provide an internationally controlled system of national responsibility
for government, and a system in which the guardianship of peoples
resembles the guardianship of minors.97 One can speculate whether the
latent British view of the "natives" as minors, led to the stricter application
of the corroboration rule when the victims were both oriental "natives"
and "children." The practice of corroboration in that setting epitomized
British anxiety toward the dubious and threatening Orient, a world of
loathsome sexuality, backward mentality, and deceit (the reaction to which
tensions converges in the practice of corroboration). The fear of
uncontrollable and perverted sexuality and its Siamese twin, the fear of
false charges motivated by revenge or blackmail, intensified in the
colonial context of the mysterious "East." Corroboration, as it was used in
Mandate Palestine, incorporated mistrust toward local complainants in
sexual assault cases not only on the basis of gender but also on the basis of
ethnic origin. It is also evident that children were treated as much less
credible than adults. Children were the victims in all of the cases in which
the court explicitly acquitted for lack of sufficient corroboration. 98
Palestine's British rulers represented themselves as the protectors of
women and children, the weak inhabitants of the land entrusted to them by
a mandate from the League of Nations. They took pride in the British legal
tradition and believed it was superior to that of their Ottoman predecessors
in Palestine. However, their explicit discourse was at odds with the actual
practice of the courts and with their reluctance to believe local victims of
sexual assaults, most notably, children. While claiming to proffer superior
moral values and expressing repulsion toward allegedly widespread sexual
immorality in Palestine, the British judiciary adopted an evidentiary
96. ROBSON, supra note 1, at 50; JOHN STRAWSON, PARTITIONING PALESTINE: LEGAL
FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT 66 (2010).
97. STRAWSON, supra note 96, at 68.
98. CrimA 54/38, Safiq Halaby v. A.G. [1938]; CrimA 71/38, Mohammad Abdel Ghani v. A.G.
[1938]; Cr. Ap. 79/38, Mahmoud Khalil v. A.G. [1938]; Cr.C 195/40, A.G. v. Rashid ad Dreakh
[1940]; CrimA 122/43, Agha v. A.G. [1943].
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standard of corroboration that was often hard to meet. In many cases,
including severe sexual assaults of children, the demand for corroboration
led to the acquittal of the accused.
In setting a high evidentiary standard in cases of sexual assault, the
corroboration rule portrays the legal system as prudent and just
(preferring, when in doubt, to acquit the guilty rather than convict the
innocent). In other words, it enhances the legitimization of the criminal
proceedings in cases of sexual offenses. In acquitting Mohammad Youssef
of the sodomy of an eight-year-old boy for lack of corroboration, the
Supreme Court noted that a "difficulty in proof does not dispense with the
proof," portraying its decision as cautious, objective, and therefore just.
The view of corroboration as just an evidentiary tool in sexual cases,
however, relies on an array of social stereotypes attached to the credibility
of the complainants, and, at the same time, perpetuates existing relations
of power and legitimizes them as objective, just, and neutral. In the
context of Mandate Palestine, the British view that rigid corroboration,
though possibly not required as a matter of law, was "rightly followed" (as
the Supreme Court put it when acquitting Muhammad Agha of the rape of
his minor daughter) is predicated on the perceived inferiority and
unreliability of the local witnesses, especially the young, in cases of sexual
assault. In private correspondence, as I have noted, Mandate judges
disclosed their biases regarding the loathsome sexuality and dishonesty of
Palestine's inhabitants. The judges were more careful in their public
pronouncements (especially when there was no individualized suspicion
against a complainant). However, an occasional derisive remark
sometimes slipped out, as in the minority opinion of Acting Supreme
Court Justice Curry in the rape-cum-robbery case involving nineteen year-
old Rachel and her companions. Curry held that the evidence
corroborating Rachel's rape testimony was inadequate. He further asserted
that "[i]t is quite a common thing in this country for complainants to add a
charge of rape to one of assault or robbery and it is not easy for an accused
to defend himself successfully against such a fabricated charge."99
John Hamilton Baker poses the question, "What is law for the purpose
of legal history?"' 00 Examination of how the rule of corroboration was
applied in Mandate Palestine demonstrates that law is not merely an
accumulation of written rules or precedents but rather part of a
hermeneutic system of rules that acquire their meaning in a given
historical and cultural context. Moreover, even when those rules originate
in another jurisdiction, they are not fixed "transplants" that reproduce the
99. ISA Division 30 (Supreme Court Files), File B/441, original docket # Cr.A 31/47 Fahed
Kathem & Musa Ahmed v. A.G. [1947].
100. John Hamilton Baker, Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished, 59
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 62, 66 (2000).
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original rules. Transplantation of legal rules, as Pierre Legrand suggests, is
not detached from social and cultural context.' 1 But it is not only in the
subjectivities of the recipients of the new rule that the meaning of the
transplanted law is shaped but also in the subjectivities of the colonial
agents who impose the rule on the territories they administer. The biases
and prejudice of the latter may inject new meanings into the law.
101. Pierre Legrand, What "Legal Transplants"?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 55 (David
Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001). For Alan Watson's reply, see Alan Watson, Legal Transplants
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